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ON IMPEACHING PRESIDENTS
Akhil Reed Amar*
The constitutional tragedy-or was it farce?-that the nation went
through at the end of the millennium was literally unprecedented. Never
before had a duly elected President been impeached by the House and
tried by the Senate. (Andrew Johnson, it must be recalled, became
President by dint of one man's bullet, rather than all men's ballots.)
These momentous events raised profound constitutional questions for
politicians, journalists, and, ultimately, ordinary Americans in whose
name our government governs.
As a student of the Constitution, I had views about many of the
most interesting constitutional questions facing the republic. In various
places, I tried to make those views known. What follows are slightly
revised versions of pop essays that I penned and a public lecture that I
gave as events were unfolding. To remind readers that these remarks
were offered in real time-before and during the hurly-burly, and not
after all the dust had settled-I have chosen to retain present verb tenses
wherever appropriate.
In general, the material below attempts to address the following
questions. First, what was the Framers' general framework for presi-
dential impeachment? Second, and relatedly, how did the independent
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counsel statute mesh with, or gum up, the Framers' impeachment ma-
chinery? Third, exactly how should modem Americans understand the
freighted phrase, "high crimes and misdemeanors?" In particular,
should this phrase be applied to Presidents in exactly the same way that
it should be applied to, say, judges or cabinet officers? Fourth, what role
should public opinion play in the impeachment process? Finally, how
should some of impeachment's more technical procedural issues be
handled?
I. THE GENERAL IMPEACHMENT FRAMEWORK1
America delights in her inventions. From bifocals at the Founding
to light bulbs, flying machines, and computers in the modem era, we
constantly quest for the holy grail of the better mousetrap. America's
constitutional lawyers over the centuries have also proved remarkably
inventive, crafting clever legal contraptions to solve recurring problems.
Since Watergate, the problem of wayward Presidents has grabbed our
imagination, and creative constitutional lawyers have responded with a
new invention: an independent counsel, appointed by judges and insu-
lated from executive branch supervision. But the theoretical possibility
of a President gone bad did not suddenly arise with the reelection of
Richard Nixon. Our inventive Founders foresaw the problem, and
forged their own clever machinery to solve it: impeachment. And this
machinery, I suggest, is a better mousetrap. Once we understand how it
was engineered to work, we will see more clearly some of the design
flaws of the modem independent counsel statute.
Presidential impeachment features a brilliant mix of temporary
immunity and ultimate accountability. A sitting President is immune
from ordinary criminal prosecution, but once impeached by the House
and convicted by the Senate, or otherwise out of office, he may be pun-
ished just like everyone else. Granted, the Constitution does not say this
in so many words, and all other impeachable officers-from Vice-
Presidents and cabinet secretaries to judges and justices-may be in-
dicted, tried, convicted and imprisoned while still in office. But history
and structure make clear what the constitutional text leaves open. In two
different Federalist Papers (Numbers 69 and 77), Publius suggested that
criminal prosecution of the President could not occur until after he left
office, a point stressed in the First Congress by Senator (and later Chief
Justice) Oliver Ellsworth and Vice-President (and later President) John
1. This section derives from an essay published in the September, 1998 issue of The Ameri-
can Lawyer. See Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Impeachment, AM. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 92.
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Adams. Structurally, this makes good sense. Unlike other national offi-
cers, the President is vested with the power of an entire branch of gov-
ernment. He is not fungible in the way that judges and cabinet officers
are, and his duties are far more continuous and weighty than those of the
Vice-President. Suppose a President is actually innocent of wrongdoing,
and a given criminal prosecution is simply designed to stop him from
doing what he was elected to do. Such a prosecution, even if unsuccess-
ful, could effectively (and perhaps literally, given pretrial detention) in-
capacitate him and thereby nullify a national election-it is a kind of
temporary assassination, a highjacking and kidnapping of the President.
Could some clever state prosecutor from South Carolina have indicted
Abraham Lincoln in the spring of 1861, demanding that he stand trial in
Charleston on some trumped-up charge? Surely not. Thus, a sitting
President may not be trifled with in this way-but Congress may boot
him out if they decide that he has indeed committed offenses that make
him unfit to govern. After he leaves office, whether via impeachment,
resignation, or the natural expiration of his term, he can be tried like any
other citizen. If the charges are sound, he will be held to account: no
man is above the law. If the charges are instead trumped up, they can be
quashed beforehand or overturned afterwards by judges (as is true for
all other citizens). The ex-President would be inconvenienced by all of
this, but he could be compensated by Congress. Most important, the
American people would not be denied one millisecond of his tenure in
office unless and until Congress made that awesome decision, via the
impeachment process.
2. The 1997 Supreme Court ruling in the Paula Jones case might seem to squint against this
reading of the Constitution's structure and history: the Jones Court denied that a sitting President
should enjoy temporary immunity from a civil lawsuit. But criminal prosecution is hugely differ-
ent, constitutionally. The Jones Court stressed the lack of historical support for civil immunity, but
there is clear historical support for temporary immunity from criminal prosecution. In Jones, no
question arose about who could initiate the lawsuit-in America, any plaintiff can sue any defen-
dant. But not every citizen can indict; who can indict the President and oblige him to stand trial? A
county or state prosecutor? Even in civil cases, Jones refused to rule on whether a sitting President
could be made to answer in state court, emphasizing that the case at hand would be carefully man-
aged by a federal Article IR judge nominated by the nation's President and confirmed by the na-
tion's Senate. If state prosecution is impermissible-recal Lincoln in 1861-how about federal
prosecution? Here the problem is not one of federalism but of separation of powers. How can an
"inferior" executive officer-independent counsel Kenneth Starr, who was neither appointed by
the President, nor confirmed by the Senate-undermine and overrule his constitutional superior,
the chief executive? (Tihis issue did not arise in the 1988 Morrison v. Olson case upholding the
independent counsel statute, since the investigation in that case targeted a lower level official, not
the President himself.) Doesn't even a federal grand jury pose some of the same risks as a state
prosecution, given that any given grand jury will come from a single city or county-the "part"
and not the "whole" in the language of McCulloch v. Maryland? Unlike Jones' civil case, no fed-
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Here, then, are a few of the most impressive features of the Fram-
ers' mousetrap. First, impeachment is national. The President uniquely
represents the entire American people, and the decision to arrest his per-
formance in office can only be made by representatives of the country
as a whole. A President may need to pursue policies that are nationally
sound, but regionally unpopular. Thus, the true grand and petit juries
eligible to judge a sitting President must come not from one city or
county but from all cities and counties. That grand jury is the House of
Representatives, and the formal name of its bill of indictment is a bill of
impeachment. That petit jury is the Senate, and in impeachment it sits as
a great national court, representing the vast geographic diversity of
America. A related advantage is that it sits in the capital, thus minimiz-
ing any geographic inconvenience to a sitting President. To allow regu-
lar federal grand juries into this picture, whether in Charleston or Little
Rock, would in the words of President Thomas Jefferson "bandy [the
President] from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north
to south and east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitu-
tional duties."3
Next, impeachment is public and accountable. Ordinary grand ju-
ries are subject to strict secrecy rules, but these may tend to break down
where something as awesome and interesting as an investigation of the
President is afoot. The impeachment process is more flexible-
presumptively done in public, as is the rest of congressional business,
but allowing secrecy where appropriate. If independent counsels or or-
dinary grand juries are too hard on Presidents-or too soft-there is no
recourse for the American people. But if Congress is too hard or soft,
they will pay at election time.
A related point: impeachment is sensibly political as well as legal.
Politicians judge other politicians and impose political punishments-
removal from office and disqualification from future office-holding.
The standard of conduct is not narrowly legal but also political: what
counts as a "high crime and misdemeanor" cannot be decided simply by
eral judge representing the people of the nation monitors grand jury proceedings day by day and in
person. Consider next issues of enforcement and remedy. Had President Clinton refused to partici-
pate in Jones-saying that he was elected to do the people's business, and could not be dis-
tracted-a simple default judgment could have been entered. with a push of a button, funds could
be transferred from his bank account to the plaintiff's. But if the President were to refuse to ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of a criminal proceeding-claiming that the only criminal court with
compulsory jurisdiction over him was the High Court of Impeachment-what are courts to do? Put
him in leg irons? Order his imprisonment?
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (May 20, 1807), reprinted in DAVID N.
MAYER, THE CONSTrtTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275 (1994).
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parsing criminal law statutes. A statute-book offense is not necessary
for impeachment: a President might be unfit to govern even if his mis-
conduct was not an ordinary crime. (Imagine a President who simply
runs off on vacation in the middle of a crisis.) Conversely, not every
technical offense in statute books-especially offenses that are not ordi-
narily prosecuted-should count as the kind of high misconduct that
unfits a man to be President after his fellow citizens have chosen him.
Indeed, what counts as sufficiently high misconduct may be different
for judges or cabinet officers-who lack a personal mandate from the
electorate-than for a President who enjoys such a mandate. An offense
that was made known to electors, or that could have been foreseen by
them, may differ from an offense carefully hidden from them. (On this
view, lying to the American people-even if not under oath and not
technically criminal-might be more serious than technical pejury in a
civil deposition.) All these distinctions have little place in our formal
criminal law, but they are precisely the sorts of factors statesmen may
sensibly consider in the impeachment process. And such statesmen have
strong incentives to set the bar of acceptable conduct neither too high
(for they and their friends will have to live under these rules) nor too
low (lest they disgust ordinary voters appalled by backscratching and
self-dealing).
Impeachment is also nicely nonpartisan. In the endgame, a Presi-
dent will be ousted only if fair-minded members of his own party con-
demn him; anything less than a two-thirds vote of conviction is an ac-
quittal. Though the Framers did not envision the emergence of two
permanent parties that would alternate in the presidency, they did expect
Congress at any given time to be divided between the President's allies
and his enemies; and they devised a beautiful system giving the balance
of power to Senators who could be expected to give the President the
benefit of the doubt in close cases. Talk of "vast conspiracies" could be
easily laughed off, given the structural safeguards built into the system.
And by keeping judges out of the process of appointing independent
counsels and trying sitting Presidents-actions inevitably tinged with
politics-the impeachment model keeps judges above the fray of parti-
san politics.
Impeachment is also beautifully final. No appeal lies from the
judgment of an impeachment court. By contrast imagine the chaos that
might be created by ordinary prosecution and conviction of a sitting
President. Could he run the country from a jail cell? This seems outland-
ish. If, instead, we treated imprisonment as a "disability" triggering
vice-presidential succession under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, how
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will we all feel if a later court invalidates the President's conviction on
appeal?
Finally, impeachment is-or should be made-regularized and
routine. An ad hoe independent counsel must build an organization
from scratch, and those who volunteer may have an ax to grind, since
the target is known in advance. Institutional routines to guard against
leaks and other unprofessional conduct may be harder to develop and
implement in an ad hoc enterprise. But Congress can and should create
a standing committee on impeachment and oversight. The committee
could have permanent staff, and be insulated by House tradition from
partisanship. Over time, the committee could develop policies, proce-
dures, protocols and precedents that can be applied consistently regard-
less of which party controls the House, and which party occupies the
Oval Office. Other high constitutional functions of Congress have been
routinized-appropriations, discipline of errant legislators, foreign af-
fairs, and so on. Why not impeachment? If we want the Framers'
mousetrap to work, we must keep it well oiled.
I. IMPEACHMENT AND THE STARR REPORT4
Like many adults, I am dreading the inevitable moment when my
kids ask me to explain the Starr report to them. Not because of the
sex-the "kids" I am worried about are my first-year students at Yale
Law School, and I assume they know about sex. What they do not (yet)
know, and are endlessly curious about, is how the Constitution works,
or at least how it was designed to work. If they look to the report for
constitutional theory, they may get perverse ideas.
"Professor," I can hear them saying, "you said that the Constitution
carefully separates the three branches of government. So how can judi-
cial branch officers pick an independent counsel who wields executive
branch powers yet reports to the legislative branch? If the Framers scru-
pulously excluded ordinary judges from the impeachment process, why
were three judges allowed to pick the man who now acts as Congress's
designated impeachment adviser? If federal prosecutors are constitu-
tionally confined to punishing violations of federal criminal statutes,
then why does this prosecutor's report contain all sorts of material
ranging beyond statute-book offenses-charges of lying to the Ameri-
can people and the cabinet, for example?"
4. This section derives from an article published in the September 20, 1998 edition of the
Washington Post in its Sunday Outlook Section. See Akhil Reed Amar, Now Playing... A Consti-
tutional Nightmare, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1998, at Cl.
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I have no good answers. For the truth is that the statute that created
the independent counsel-vesting his appointment in judges, arming
him with awesome inquisitorial powers and instructing him to hand over
all his findings to Congress-cannot be squared with the Constitution
designed by the Founders. If this fact was not clear to all before the re-
port, it should be clear now.
For the unconstitutional mess we find ourselves in I blame not
Kenneth Starr but the independent counsel statute (first signed into law
in 1978 and reauthorized by President Clinton in 1994). Indeed, I have
been a critic of this law and its predecessors for a good decade. Starr is
just doing what the law allows and indeed tells him to do. He did not
seek out this dirty job-he was chosen, and simply answered when his
country called.
But how was he picked, and by whom? Behind closed doors, by
three judges. This is bad business. In our constitutional tradition, judges
typically act after open argument in open court. By contrast, the inde-
pendent counsel statute permits ordinarily taboo ex parte (secret) com-
munications under the following logic. Because the statute tells judges
not to decide a legal case but to answer an inherently political and pol-
icy question-who should investigate the administration?-then judges
may act politically rather than judicially, and may consult Senators or
anyone else they choose, in whatever manner they choose, as they de-
cide who is best for the job. But this logic only raises the question of
why Congress would give judges such a political and potentially parti-
san task-especially when the investigation is of the President himself.
The Constitution says that the House shall prosecute impeachments and
the Senate shall try them. This system insulates Senators from the
prosecution business, so that they may be impartial triers of law and
fact. But under the statute, various Senators may end up sitting in judg-
ment on a report from a prosecutor they helped pick in secret conversa-
tions with lower court judges (who are supposed to have no role what-
soever in impeachment). Whether any Senators in fact helped pick Starr
is less important than the fact that the statute allowed them to do so.
The Constitution also says that when a President is impeached, the
Chief Justice shall preside over his trial in the Senate. The idea here was
to have a presiding officer utterly free from even the appearance of
conflict of interest. (Ordinarily, the presiding officer of the Senate is the
Vice-President, and it would be unseemly for him to preside over a trial
that could vault him into the presidency.) But Chief Justice William
Rehnquist is the very man who hand-picked the three judges who hand-
picked Starr. The independent counsel statute says that the three judges
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who pick a special prosecutor should never preside over trials initiated
by that prosecutor-lest defendants and the public think that the fix is
in, and that the judges will be tempted to make their choice look good.
But now, if a trial in the Senate were to materialize, the Chief Justice
can be seen to be linked to one side. If Starr is not quite the chief's man,
he is the man picked by the chief's men.
Consider next a more literal violation of the Constitution made
visible by the Starr report. Why in the world are judges ever allowed to
pick prosecutors? Judges are members of the judicial branch, and prose-
cutors wield executive power, which our Constitution vests in the Presi-
dent, not the judiciary. (Remember that, preceding the independent
counsel statute, Watergate special prosecutors Archibald Cox and Leon
Jaworski were technically appointed by the White House.) Having
judges pick prosecutors is as inapt as having them pick generals or dip-
lomats. The Constitution does say that the law may vest judges with
unilateral power to pick "inferior" officers, but the obvious idea here is
inferior judicial officers-magistrates and special masters. However,
the Supreme Court rejected this logic a decade ago, in the Morrison v.
Olson5 decision upholding an early version of the independent counsel
statute. In 1997, in the obscure case of Edmond v. United States,6 the
Court seemed to repudiate its Morrison analysis by insisting that every
"inferior" officer must have a clear "superior" with broad power to
monitor and countermand his decisions. Under this test, Starr could not
be called "inferior" because Attorney General Janet Reno lacks broad
power to control him-but it is unclear whether the Court would now be
willing to use Edmond to openly overrule Morrison and apply its new
test to Starr.
Where ordinary special prosecutors are involved, perhaps we could
say that they are in some sense "inferior." These prosecutors are target-
ing officials other than the President, and if the President dislikes what a
prosecutor is doing, he may always pardon the targets-even pretrial-
and in effect make the prosecutor go away. (This is what President Bush
did to Iran-Contra independent counsel Lawrence Walsh by pardoning
Walsh's target, Caspar Weinberger.) Through the pardon, the President
maintains ultimate control over prosecutions, and can, at least arguably,
keep special prosecutors in line as his "inferiors."
But when the President is himself the target of the special prosecu-
tor-as was not the case in Morrison-he cannot in any conceivable
5. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
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way control the prosecutor because he cannot constitutionally pardon
himself. Nor can he exempt himself from the impeachment process.
Thus, when Starr issues a report calling for the President's impeach-
ment, he is clearly acting not as some inferior officer who can be coun-
termanded by the chief executive. Rather, he is acting as one of the
largest legal and political actors on our national stage. If we are to cre-
ate so powerful a figure, the Constitution requires that such a grand of-
ficer be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, receiv-
ing a personal vote of confidence from both political branches.
It is tempting to respond that Starr's report has no automatic legal
significance it is as if any private citizen "reported" to Congress and
called for the President's impeachment. But this is laughable in fact and
unsupportable in law. No private citizen is given the government funds
and government power that Starr has been given. No private citizen is
directed by law to give Congress impeachment reports.
There is a dangerous dance here. Starr does the dirty work and
hands his report to Congress, which then publicizes it and even releases
evidence gathered under grand jury secrecy. But neither takes full re-
sponsibility for this joint product. If Americans think Starr pushed too
hard or was unfair, Congress can say "Blame him not us-it is his in-
vestigation and his report." And if Americans think that the report-and
the videotape due out soon-should not have been publicized in the way
it was, Starr can say "Blame Congress, not me-they are the ones
dumping all this stuff on the Internet." The proper lines of constitutional
accountability are being blurred.
So are the lines between criminal law and high politics. Impeach-
ment is not a technical issue of statute-book offenses-otherwise, it
would have been given to judges, not politicians. The question of "high
crimes and misdemeanors" is whether a President has engaged in such
grave misconduct (whether or not technically criminal) that he is no
longer fit to lead a great and free nation-whether, in other words, the
votes of millions should be undone because of his gross misbehavior.
And so Starr's inclusion of non-criminal matter is fitting in an im-
peachment report-but unfitting given that Starr is otherwise supposed
to be a prosecutor, not an impeachment adviser. Ordinary prosecutors
who uncover gross misbehavior that does not constitute a statute-book
offense keep this to themselves. The proceedings of ordinary grand ju-
ries are secret. Ordinary prosecutors report to the Justice Department,
not Congress. The report is a kind of hybrid monster-half-indictment,
half-impeachment-the likes of which America has never seen.
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Now that this beast roams among us, what are we to do? There is,
alas, no easy way for Congress to cage what it has unleashed. After the
havoc, Congress can say "never again!" by allowing the independent
counsel statute to die when it lapses by its own terms next year. But I
am afraid we are in for dark and unpredictable days ahead, in which the
only advice I could offer Congress would be to approach every issue in
the most bipartisan manner possible. But that has not happened thus far,
and is unlikely to happen in an election year.
And what shall I tell my students when they ask me to make consti-
tutional sense of this report? It will be painful to tell them that a statute
they were told was such a wonderful post-Watergate reform is, in fact, a
constitutional abomination.
III. THE MEANING OF "HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS" 7
The biggest linguistic question confronting America is not what the
meaning of "is" is--or what the words "sexual relations," "Oval Of-
fice," and "alone" mean. It is how to construe the phrase "high crimes
and misdemeanors." Our legal tradition gives us simple but powerful
tools to extract meaning from the Constitution. With these tools in hand,
we can test whether the Starr report justifies ousting a duly elected
President.
Begin with the hardboiled legal realist claim that the Article II,
Section 4 phrase means whatever the Congress wants it to mean-it is
all politics. But it is not. The Constitution does not say that a President
may be ousted whenever half of the House and two-thirds of the Senate
want him out. The supreme law of the land prescribes a substantive
standard-high misconduct-as well as a procedural voting rule, and
conscientious legislators cannot ignore this standard. Even if we view
the matter from a purely political perspective-taking hardboiled real-
ism on its own terms-a Senator must say more than "I vote against Bill
because I prefer Al (and I vote against Al because I prefer Newt)." Po-
litically as well as constitutionally, lawmakers cannot credibly attack
Clinton for playing fast and loose with words while doing the same
thing themselves. They cannot wax sanctimonious about oaths while ig-
noring their own oaths to uphold the Constitution.
7. This section derives from a public lecture delivered to the Federalist Society in Washing-
ton, D.C., on November 11, 1998. Portions of this lecture later appeared in an essay published in
the January 18, 1999 issue of The New Republic. See Akhil Reed Amar, Trial and Tribulation,
NEw REPuBLIC, Jan. 18, 1999, at 17.
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But here is the kernel of truth in the realist claim: the House and
Senate will be the last word on impeachment. No Article I court (or
state court for that matter) will review their interpretation of the key
phrase. Impeachment is, technically, what judges call a "political ques-
tion" that ordinary courts will not touch. This is not an exception to the
basic constitutional principle of judicial review, but a special case of it.
There is indeed "judicial" review of impeachment issues, but this re-
view occurs in the Senate itself, which sits as a high court of impeach-
ment. Its impeachment verdict conclusively binds other courts because
this special tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction, and its rulings on fact
and law are what lawyers call res judicata-final judgments. Over and
over, the Constitution describes the Senate in impeachment as a court-
with the power to "try" "cases," render "judgment," and impose
"conviction" on the defendant. In presidential impeachments, this judi-
cial character is reinforced by a constitutional rule that the Chief Justice
shall preside over the High Court of the Senate. These judicial trappings
are further evidence that, contrary to hardboiled realism, it is not all
politics-it is also a judicial trial under the law designed to impose
punishment for "high crimes."
If the Senate must act as a court, with a duty to properly construe
"high crimes and misdemeanors," how should it go about this task? Or-
dinary courts often look first to judicial precedent, but this interpretive
tool is of little help here. The Supreme Court has never defined "high
crimes and misdemeanors"---even if it did, the Senate should feel free
to ignore such inappropriate intermeddling-and the precedents in the
Senate itself shed little light. In a dozen cases over the last two centu-
ries, the Senate has tried impeachments of judges and cabinet officers,
but how much (if any) weight should these precedents carry in a presi-
dential impeachment? The only Senate precedents that could defimi-
tively clarify the standards for presidential impeachment would them-
selves be presidential impeachments. But we have only one of these on
the books, and that impeachment--of Andrew Johnson in 1868-
resulted in an acquittal, leaving us precisely zero square senatorial
precedents telling us what misconduct is enough to oust a President.
Some scholars have suggested that we look to history for answers.
But which history? The phrase took root in fourteenth century England.
Surely this is not the right time and place to search for answers. Prac-
tices that may have made sense in a monarchy or in a parliamentary
government have no place in a modem constitutional democracy
committed to separation of powers. The history of the 1787 Philadelphia
convention helps clarify what was in the minds of the drafters when
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they inserted the "high crimes" phraseology and rejected the looser idea
that Presidents could be impeached merely for "maladministration." But
these convention conversations occurred behind closed doors. The
American people were asked to ratify a public text, not secret intentions.
What's more, our constitutional system for selecting Presidents differs
from the system in place in 1787. Aided by a formal constitutional
amendment (the Twelfth) that paved the way for presidential parties to
emerge, modem America has committed itself to a kind of national
populist Presidency that differs from what the Philadelphia draftsmen
had in mind.
What, then, is the best way to make sense of our Constitution on
the key question of the day? I suggest that we carefully examine the
Constitution's text, and attend to its overarching structure. Begin with
the obvious tool of textual analysis. The key phrase, in its entirety, says
that the President may be impeached for "Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Presumably, the word "high" here
means something, suggesting that not all crimes (or other forms of mis-
conduct) justify impeachment. If we seek to discover how "high" a
crime must be, the text itself gives us two specific examples to anchor
the inquiry-treason and bribery. Both are "high" crimes indeed. Trea-
son involves waging war against America, betraying one's country to an
enemy power. Bribery-secretly bending laws to favor the rich and
powerful-involves official corruption of a highly malignant sort,
threatening the very soul of a democracy committed to equality under
the law. And in the case of a President who does not take bribes but
gives them-paying people to vote for him-the bribery undermines the
very legitimacy of the election that brought him to office. Few crimes
are as deadly to a democratic republic-as high-as treason and brib-
ery.
Those who argue that any presidential failure to obey the law
constitutes a failure to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"
and that all such failures are impeachable, have simply read the word
"high" out of the Constitution. On their theory, any crime, high or low,
would be impeachable. Consider, in this regard, the words of the Article
I, Section 6 Arrest Clause and the Article IV, Section 2 Extradition
Clause. Like the Impeachment Clause, these clauses also speak of trea-
son and other crimes. But they do so in markedly different language-
"Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace" in the Arrest Clause, and
'Treason, Felony, or other Crime" in the Extradition Clause. These
clauses do encompass virtually all crimes, high and low. And they
strongly suggest that the word "high" in the Impeachment Clause must
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be taken seriously. When the Framers meant all crimes, high and low,
they knew the words-and the words are markedly different from those
of the Impeachment Clause.
So much for text. Consider now how the text must be read in light
of larger constitutional principles defining the Constitution's overall ar-
chitecture-its structure. The Constitution's text does not use the words
"federalism," or "separation of powers," or "judicial review," but these
principles can be discerned from the document's structural blueprint.
The first insight generated by structural analysis is that the meaning of a
single constitutional phrase sometimes varies, as that phrase interacts
with other parts of the document: the words "high crimes" might, in
application, mean something somewhat different when applied to Presi-
dents than when applied to other impeachable officers.
A blinkered textualist might deny this, pointing to Article II, Sec-
tion 4, in its entirety: "The President, Vice President and all civil offi-
cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors." This clause lumps together presidential impeachments with
all others (of Vice-Presidents, judges, justices, cabinet officers, inferior
officers) and uses the same linguistic standard (high crimes) across the
board.
At first this seems a strong argument. But it crumbles on closer in-
spection-and every Senator should intuitively understand why. Con-
sider another patch of constitutional text familiar to every Senator and
implicating Senate oversight of the President. According to Article II,
Section 2, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate ... [the
President] shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States." If we applied the same blinkered textualism to this clause, we
would say that the Senate must give the exact same deference to a
President's choice for Supreme Court Justice that it would give to a
President's choice for his cabinet, and that the Senate should never ap-
ply a stricter standard when considering a nomination to the Supreme
Court than to a district court. After all, this clause lumps together all
officers, high and low, executive and judicial, and uses the same lin-
guistic standard (advice and consent) across the board.
But this has never been the Senate's view of the matter-and
rightly so. The Senate has rejected blinkered textualism in favor of a
more structural and holistic approach that ponders all the texts of the
Constitution and considers their interrelation. Other parts of the Consti-
tution establish important differences between, say, cabinet officers and
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judges. Cabinet officers are part of the President's executive branch
team under Article II. They answer to him (quite literally, in the Article
If, Section 2 Opinions Clause) and will leave when he leaves. Federal
judges are not part of the President's team in the same sense. They will
not leave when he leaves. Indeed, their independence is secured by life
tenure under Article Ill-a separate article for a separate branch. In
light of these important constitutional differences, the Senate has always
given the President far more leeway in naming his own executive team
than in proposing judicial nominees. And, even within a single branch,
the Senate scrutinizes a nominee to the Supreme Court more intensely
than a nominee to some lower court. Just ask Robert Bork.
Now apply these structural insights to the "high crimes" clause,
and count the ways in which presidential impeachments are qualita-
tively different from all others. When Senators remove one of a thou-
sand federal judges (or even one of nine justices), they are not trans-
forming an entire branch of government. But that is exactly what
happens when they oust America's one and only President, in whom all
executive power is vested by the first sentence of Article II. In the case
of a judge, a long and grueling impeachment trial itself inflicts no great
trauma on the nation-but, again, the case of a President is very differ-
ent. (And do not forget the disruption of the Chief Justice's schedule,
and the commandeering of the entire Senate; only in presidential im-
peachments must the Chief Justice preside, and this special rule makes
it virtually impossible for the Senate to shunt off important presidential
impeachment decisions to smaller committees, as is the current practice
for nonpresidential impeachments.) Presidential impeachments involve
high statecraft and international affairs-the entire world is watching-
in a manner wholly unlike other impeachments.
Most important, when Senators oust a judge, they undo their own
prior vote (via advice and consent to judicial nominees). When they re-
move a duly elected President, they undo the votes of millions of ordi-
nary Americans on Election Day. This is not something that Senators
should do lightly, lest we slide toward a kind of parliamentary govern-
ment that our entire structure of government was designed to repudiate.
Although the Philadelphia Framers may not have anticipated the rise of
a populist Presidency, later generations of Americans restructured the
Philadelphians' electoral college, via the Twelfth Amendment and other
election reforms, precisely to facilitate such a Presidency. Narrow ar-
guments from the high crimes clause in isolation fail to see how holistic




To recast these points about constitutional structure into the lan-
guage of policy, even if the Senate decides that all perjury-of any sort,
by any officer-is an impeachable high crime, Senators must further
decide whether a given perjury warrants removal as a matter of sound
judgment and statesmanship. In making this decision, they must be
sensitive to the ways in which the Presidency is a very different office
from a federal district judgeship. Where extremely "high crimes" are
implicated-treason or tyranny-Senators should probably be quicker
to pull the trigger on a bad President, whose office enables him unilat-
erally to do many dangerous things. (A single bad judge, by contrast, is
hemmed in by colleagues and higher courts.) But where borderline or
low "high crimes" are involved, the Senate would be wise to spare the
people's President-especially if his crimes reflect character flaws that
the people duly considered before voting for him, or if the people con-
tinue to support him even after the facts come to light. If we absolutely
insist on textual (as opposed to structural) evidence supporting our dis-
tinction between presidential and judicial impeachments, we can find it
in Article I, Section 3, which tells us that only in presidential impeach-
ments does the Chief Justice preside. There are several good reasons for
this rule, and one of them is to hammer home the constitutional unique-
ness of presidential impeachments.
With the lessons of text and structure in mind, we can now prof-
itably revisit precedent and history. Those who point to a trio of judicial
impeachments in the late 1980s as support for a low impeachment
threshold have precisely missed the point: we must look to presidential
history and precedent for guidance. To counterbalance the 1980s trio of
judicial impeachments, let's look at a trio of Presidents over the centu-
ries who had their own troubles with Congress. Begin with Andrew
Jackson, who killed a man in a duel before he was elected President.
Technically, this was a crime-although rarely prosecuted. Should
Congress have impeached and removed Jackson---even if the people
who elected him knew about his crime, and elected him anyway? The
duel Jackson fought concerned his wife's honor and chastity. Suppose
Jackson had lied under oath to protect his wife's honor. Again, suppose
the people knew all this when they voted for him. Should Congress have
undone the people's votes, on a theory that all crime is high crime, and
that all perjury is the same? Now consider the next Presidential An-
drew-Johnson, that is. Given our structural analysis, it seems relevant
that Johnson was never elected President in his own right, and that he
was in fact trying to undo the policies of the man the people had elected,
Abraham Lincoln. If ever our structural argument cautioning restraint in
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ousting an elected President were weak, it was here, since Johnson
lacked a genuine electoral mandate. And his policies towards the de-
feated rebels could indeed have been viewed as akin to treason, giving
considerable aid and comfort to those rebels who were-not to mince
words-traitors. And yet even here-an unelected President cozying up
to actual traitors-the Senate acquitted. Finally, consider President
Nixon, whose extremely high crimes and gross abuses of official power
did indeed pose a threat to our basic constitutional system, a threat as
high as treason and bribery. Although Nixon was elected by the people,
his own unprecedented use of political espionage and sabotage tainted
his mandate, in the same way that bribing electors would have. When all
the facts were brought to light and the tapes came out, the people did
indeed turn against him, prompting leaders of both parties to conclude
that the time had come for him to go.
William Jefferson Clinton is not above the law. But the law that the
Congress must apply is the law applicable to Presidents, not the law
applicable to district judges. In trying a man whose name has eerily in-
tertwined with that of Nixon again and again, Congress must remember
that Bill Clinton is best judged in light of the case of President Richard
Nixon, not the case of Judge Walter Nixon.
Using standard tools of constitutional analysis, then, here are the
questions conscientious Congressmen should ask themselves as they
ponder the Starr report: Are the alleged misdeeds truly as malignant and
threatening to democratic government as are treason and bribery? Do
they justify putting the nation and the world through the obvious trauma
that an impeachment trial itself-whatever its outcome-would in-
volve? Do the misdeeds justify nullifying the votes of millions of
Americans, on the assumption that they would never have voted for Bill
Clinton had they suspected he was capable of doing what the report al-
leges? Would virtually all past Presidents-none of whom has been re-
moved, and only one of whom was even impeached-have easily
passed the standard being proposed by those who argue for Clinton's
impeachment?
How high is high enough? The Constitution cannot answer that
question for us, but it can give us the right questions to ask.
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IV. THE PEOPLE'S COURT: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN
IMPEACHMENT 8
Who rules America-the people or the law? Henry Hyde and his
fellow House Managers have wrapped themselves in "the rule of law"--
the polls be damned. But under our Constitution, We the People or-
dained and established the law, and the law itself often encourages
Senators to defer to the people's verdict.
Sometimes, the rule of law does require a Senator to damn the
polls. If in her heart a Senator thinks the President is innocent in fact (he
actually did not do it) or in law (even if he did it, it is not a "high crime
or misdemeanor"), then she must vote not guilty-even if she thereby
offends her constituents, who want the man's head. She has taken a sol-
emn oath to do justice, and she would violate that oath if she voted to
convict a man she believed innocent. Impeachment is a quasi-criminal
affair, in which the Senate, sitting as a court, is asked to convict the de-
fendant of high criminality or gross misbehavior in a trial designed not
merely to remove but also to stigmatize the offending officeholder. No
Senator may properly vote to convict Bill Clinton, merely because, say,
her constituents prefer Al Gore.
But none of this helps Henry Hyde and company, who are of
course the ones seeking Clinton's head. Impeachment rules are not
symmetric between conviction and acquittal. It takes 67 votes to con-
vict, but only 34 to acquit; the House must prove the President guilty,
but the President need not prove anything. Similarly, although no
Senator may vote to convict a man she deems innocent, any Senator
may vote to acquit a man he deems guilty. Like any ordinary criminal
juror, each Senator is free to be merciful for a wide variety of reasons-
because she thinks the defendant has suffered enough, or because the
punishment does not fit the crime, or because punishing the defendant
would impose unacceptable costs on innocent third parties.
In pondering mercy, ordinary jurors search their souls as the con-
science of the community, and Senators are free to do the same. But un-
like ordinary jurors, Senators are elected, and thus they are also free to
consult their constituents. Sometimes, deferring to "the masses" might
be irresponsible-for example, if the citizenry were ignorant of the facts
or incapable of thinking through the complicated legal question at hand.
S. This section derives from an essay that initially appeared in January, 1999 in The Ameri-
can Lawyer Media On-line. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Convict-in-Chief?-The Logical Conclusion




Under these circumstances, Hyde might be right to urge Senators to
look only to their souls and not to the polls. But is the Clinton case one
where the people are ignorant, or simply one where Hyde refuses to
heed their judgment?
Again and again, the House Managers have invoked "the Found-
ers." But fidelity to the Founders and fidelity to the Constitution are
very different things. Since the Founding, We the People have amended
our supreme law in many ways designed to make it more democratic
than the musty eighteenth-century parchment that the Managers
wrongly equate with "the Constitution." Consider for example the im-
peachment court itself. In the Founders' Constitution, the Senate was
elected by state legislators, rather than by the people themselves. But
the Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, brought the Senate
closer to the people by mandating direct election-and thereby impor-
tantly, if implicitly, modified the basic structure of impeachment.
Likewise, the Presidency created at Philadelphia was vastly different
from the one We the People claim for ourselves today. Political parties
did not exist, and Presidents were not picked by the direct votes of mil-
lions of citizens. (Much of the change towards a more populist and
party-based Presidency occurred as a result of the Twelfth Amendment,
which radically revised the electoral college system forged in Philadel-
phia.) In 1789, many state legislatures opted to pick presidential electors
themselves, and thereby excluded ordinary voters from directly partici-
pating in the process of presidential selection; in 1999, it would be un-
thinkable for any state to revert to this practice. In the Founders' world,
Presidents were picked without regard to the preferences of blacks and
women.
In fact, the Philadelphia Framers designed their original electoral
college precisely to make it easy for states to disenfranchise blacks and
women. A given state-say, Virginia-would receive a fixed number of
electoral votes, regardless of whether the state let blacks or women vote.
(Under direct national election, by contrast, Virginia would automati-
cally double its clout if-God forbid!-it extended the franchise to
women.) But later generations of Americans amended the document to
make clear that black and female votes must be counted: that is the ba-
sic meaning of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.
None of the House Managers is black, and none is a woman. Yet
they seek to undo the election of a man who was voted for (and who
continues to be supported) by large numbers of blacks and women.
None of the Managers is a member of the Democratic Party. And yet
they seek to unseat a duly elected Democratic President. And they con-
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tinue to insist, woodenly, that removing a man voted for by millions of
ordinary people is, under our Constitution, exactly the same as remov-
ing any one of a thousand federal judges that none of us ever voted for.
On the merits of the case, maybe the Managers are right, and the
people are wrong. Maybe Clinton is unfit to lead a great and free peo-
ple. But as every first-year law student learns, the basic question in
constitutional law is often "who decides?" To succeed, the House Man-
agers must persuade the people, not ignore them.
V. ASSORTED PROCEDURAL ISSUES9
A. Lame Duck Impeachment
Some have argued that the bill of impeachment, like all other
pending business in the outgoing 105th House, dies when the old House
dies on January 3, and must be passed again by the incoming House of
the 106th Congress. This is the rule for legislative bills: bicameralism
requires that both House and Senate agree within a single term of Con-
gress. But impeachment practice is different. Even after a grand jury has
closed shop, its indictments remain valid, and the same has historically
been true of House impeachments. But in impeachment the House plays
the role not only of grand jury, but also of prosecutor: It must appoint
Managers to physically prosecute the case in the Senate. And given that
the trial will take place in the new Senate, the House that must pick the
slate of Managers is obviously the new House. (Any Managers picked
by the old House should lose their commissions when the old House
dies). This new House is five seats less Republican than the old, and
features forty new faces-far more than the narrow margin by which
impeachment squeaked through in December.
Thus it is possible that the new House majority may actually op-
pose impeachment. And there is a clean way for them to do so: Just say
no. In other words, when a slate of Managers is proposed by pro-
impeachment leaders in the new House, anti-impeachment representa-
tives can and should vote down the slate, and vote down all substitute
slates. This, in effect, would be the impeachment equivalent of a nolle
prosequi or non prosequitur.
9. This section blends together material that initially appeared in January, 1999 in The
American Lawyer Media On-line, see supra note 8, and in the January 18, 1999 edition of The
New Republic, see supra note 7.
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B. Prosecutorial Discretion and "The Rule of Law"
In response, some will say that the House must proceed, it has no
constitutional choice, and the rule of law demands prosecution. This is
nonsense. Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution gives the House the
"power" to impeach, but imposes no duty to impeach. The Framers
knew how to use the word "duty"--indeed they used it twice in Article
II-and so there is no ambiguity here. House impeachment is about
power, not duty-about choices, not obligations. Impeachment is never
reducible to one question: Is the conduct in question impeachable? In-
stead it always also implicates a second question: Is it worth it? Just as a
grand jury can legitimately decline to indict and a prosecutor may le-
gitimately decline to prosecute as a matter of discretion-fairness con-
cerns, resource constraints, bigger fish to fry, avoidance of undue harm
to third parties-so too the new House may decide that the President
and, more importantly, the nation have suffered enough. The House's
inherent power of mercy is all the more vital given that the ordinary lo-
cus of pretrial mercy in our constitutional system-the President's par-
don power-is inapplicable. Under Article 11, Section 2, a President
may ordinarily pardon at any time and for any reason (recall Gerald
Ford's pretrial pardon of Nixon and George Bush's pretrial pardon of
Caspar Weinberger), but not "in cases of impeachment." Thus, in im-
peachment prosecutions, the Framers took the power of executive clem-
ency away from the President and gave it to the House. The new House
must be free to use this power as it sees fit. It is not a potted plant, and
indeed enjoys greater democratic legitimacy than the lame-duck House
that voted to impeach, contrary to the spirit of the people's verdict in the
November congressional election.
Again and again, House Managers have said: "Don't blame us-
the rule of law made us do it." But the rule of law does not demand that
everyone who can be prosecuted must be prosecuted. Nor does the rule
of law require that if someone, somewhere, somehow has been prose-
cuted for lying about sex, then it follows that the President must be im-
peached by the House and convicted by the Senate for lying about sex.
One sensible understanding of the rule of law does require that like
things should be treated alike, but ordinary criminal prosecutions and
presidential impeachments are unlike things-with different legal trig-




C. The Senate's Role
Like trial jurors, Senators have the inherent power to acquit against
the evidence-to decide, as the conscience of the community, that even
if the charges are true, they do not warrant a conviction. Just as a trial
jury may spare a guilty defendant even though a grand jury has properly
indicted, so the Senate has the inherent power to be merciful even if a
House majority seeks its pound of flesh. But the Senators are not merely
jurors; they are also judges as well (mirroring the twin roles of House
members as both grand jurors and prosecutors). Thus Senators are no
more bound by the House's judgment about what qualifies as a "high
crime or misdemeanor" than ordinary judges are bound by ordinary
prosecutors' (sometimes overly zealous) interpretations of ordinary
criminal laws. If a majority of Senators believe that the conduct in
question is simply not impeachable, or does not warrant undoing a na-
tional election, they can and should simply dismiss the charges up front
in a kind of Senate summary judgment.
Once again, it will be argued that the Senate has a legal and consti-
tutional duty to put the country through a grueling, expensive, disrup-
tive, and salacious trial, if this is what a House majority demands. And
once again, this view reflects constitutional confusion. Article I, Section
3 gives the Senate the "Power to try all Impeachments" but says nothing
about the duty to do so. Procedurally, the Senate may vote to end pro-
ceedings at any time if a majority of Senators agree to a motion to ad-
journ the trial.
This prospect in turn raises the specter of plea bargaining and set-
tlement. Leading Senators are free to tell the President that if he does x,
y, and z, they and a majority of their colleagues will vote to adjourn.
(House members may of course do likewise, promising to vote down
impeachment Managers, and thus avoid a trial altogether, if Clinton
agrees to their conditions.)
D. The Chief Justice's Role
Under Article I, Section 3, the Chief Justice of the United States
presides at presidential impeachments. The reason for this, however, has
little to do with any distinctive judicial expertise he might bring. Im-
peachment trials of all other officers-judges, justices, cabinet officers,
Vice-Presidents-are judicial proceedings, and yet the Chief Justice
plays no role in any of these Senate trials. The Constitution calls for the
Chief Justice to preside at presidential impeachments-and only these
impeachments-for two reasons. One is symbolic, to mark these im-
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peachments as hugely distinct from all others, calling for special so-
lemnity. The second reason is to avoid the obvious conflict of interest
that would exist if the Senate's regular presiding officer-the Vice-
President-sat in the chair. No man should be a judge (or even a non-
voting presiding officer) in his own case, and the Vice-President should
play no part in a trial that could put him in the Oval Office. This manda-
tory recusal rule made even more sense at the Founding, when Presi-
dents did not hand-pick their Vice-Presidents, who were more likely to
be rivals than partners.
As presiding officer, the Chief Justice should remember that the
Senators are not merely jurors, but judges, too-and thus they are the
ones, not he, who should ultimately decide important legal questions of
substance and procedure. Though the Chief Justice might make prelimi-
nary rulings on evidentiary and other procedural issues, the Senators
must be the final authority on these questions. And of course on the fi-
nal vote of guilty or not guilty, only "members" of the Senate may vote
under Article I, Section 3. The Chief Justice is not a "member," and will
not be called on to break a tie, since conviction requires a two-thirds
vote.
History confirms the wisdom of judicial modesty. The Framers in-
tentionally removed impeachment from ordinary judges precisely to
keep the judiciary out of this politically charged and potentially partisan
business. In the 1868 trial of Andrew Johnson, Chief Justice Salmon
Chase claimed broad powers for himself; but Chief Justice William
Rehnquist should beware following in these footsteps. Chase's critics
suspected that his trial conduct was politically motivated, and that he
was using the spotlight to promote his own presidential candidacy in the
upcoming 1868 election. Indeed, Rehnquist has already played an unfor-
tunately large and awkward role in the case against Clinton. It was he,
after all, who hand-picked the judges of the special division, which, in
turn, hand-picked independent counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate
President Clinton. And now he is set to preside over a prosecution that
was, of course, triggered by Starr. This coziness between judge and
prosecutor is uncomfortably close to the kind of appearance of impro-
priety that the Framers meant to avoid when they displaced the Vice-
President from the chair. And the appearance of impropriety is wors-
ened when we recall that the independent counsel statute itself, despite
its many unconstitutional features, was upheld by the Supreme Court in




The explicit role of the Chief Justice has profound implications for
the proper ethical relations between Senators and the President. Suppose
a sudden illness were to require the Chief Justice to resign. Although the
senior associate justice might presumably fill in temporarily, at some
point a new Chief Justice would need to be installed, and Article II,
Section 2 tells us how this would happen. The President would appoint,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, a new Chief Justice. In other
words, even in the middle of a trial, the judges and the judged might
need to confer and collaborate to pick the permanent presiding officer.
Stranger things have happened.
The point is that, even during the pendency of an impeachment
trial, the Senate and the President must work together to do the people's
business. Vacant appointments must be filled, treaties considered, laws
enacted, budgets approved, foreign policy-even war---conducted. Even
as Senators sit as detached judges and jurors over defendant Bill Clinton
every afternoon (bound by an oath of impartiality as prescribed under
Article I, Section 3), they must as legislators work closely with fellow
lawmaker Bill Clinton every morning. All this is different from im-
peachments of, say, federal district judges. In these low-level impeach-
ments, Senators may be free to shun all contact with the defendant,
analogizing such meetings to "jury tampering." But this finicky stan-
dard of legal ethics makes no constitutional sense when the man in the
dock is the President, with whom parliament must parley.
F. A Public Trial?
The Senate, in impeachment, sits as a court, and for the Framers,
the word "court" implied openness-as opposed to "chambers" (like the
Star Chamber they despised), where important decisions were made
behind closed doors. The Sixth Amendment gives the "accused" an
explicit right to demand a "public trial" in ordinary federal prosecu-
tions; but undergirding this clause is a larger, structural right of the
public itself to public trials. The spirit of all this applies with special
force to impeachment trials. The people are entitled to see their business
being done; and no business is of greater legitimate interest and impor-
tance to them than a presidential impeachment trial. The tawdriness of
the facts may tempt us to try to avoid hanging all the dirty laundry-
literally, in the case of the dress-out for all to see, but an impeachment
process shielded from public scrutiny would lack legitimacy. If the
President is ultimately ousted and the votes of millions set at naught, it
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must not look like a secret coup d'6tat; and if he is ultimately acquitted,
We the People are entitled to see why. Unless the proceedings are tele-
vised, the only "public" who will have access are those who live within
commuting distance of the Capitol.
G. The Oath, and the Role of Political Parties
The Constitution requires that when Senators sit as judges and ju-
rors in a high court of impeachment, they must "be on Oath or Affirma-
tion." Last week, each Senator took such a special oath, swearing under
God to do "impartial justice." Immediately thereafter, the Senators-all
of them-engaged in conduct that arguably betrayed the letter and spirit
of that oath.
Exactly what are the Senators supposed to be impartial between?
Truth and falsity? Surely not-they should be partial to the truth and set
against falsity. The prosecution and the defense? Perhaps, but in key
ways the system is designed to be asymmetric. Sixty-seven Senators
must vote to convict whereas a mere thirty-four Senators will suffice to
acquit; this is a partial rule, tilted towards the defendant. So is the no-
tion that evidence of Clinton's guilt must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, or at least by clear and convincing evidence. Some forms of
partiality towards the defendant are proper and even mandatory.
Given that justice need not be impartial between the prosecutor and
the defendant, the better idea is that it should be impartial across poten-
tial defendants. A given Senator should treat Clinton no differently than
she would treat any other defendant President. It should not matter
whether she is a friend or an enemy of Bill-she should treat him the
same way.
But this logic has radical implications, which the Senators have
failed to heed. To be truly, deeply, really, impartial, each Senator must
be im-party-al. That is, each Senator should try to wholly blot out of her
legal decision-making all issues concerning political party. Impartial
justice must be the same for Republican and Democratic Presidents
alike. One way to implement this ideal is to imagine that the defendant
on trial is not Bill Clinton, but is instead a Republican President who did
the same thing. Another way to do this is for a Senator to imagine that
she were actually a member of the other political party. But both of
these imaginative exercises are psychologically hard to do-akin to
writing sci-fi scripts involving parallel universes.
There is, however, one thing that a truly conscientious Senator can
easily do: shun any "party" caucus discussing impeachment issues.
Senators must be free to talk informally amongst themselves and in
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small groups-but party affiliation should play no role whatsoever. Any
Democrat who wants to listen in on a "Republican" caucus should be
allowed to do so-and vice versa. Ordinary judges, when they deliber-
ate, never break up into Democratic and Republican caucuses, and nei-
ther do ordinary jurors. Thus, when Senators last week took their oaths
and then immediately proceeded to "party" caucuses, they betrayed the
deep aspiration implicit in their oath of impartiality-of im-
partisanship. Although they eventually came together and agreed on a
unanimous proposal, none of the Senators has said that party caucuses
in impeachment are improper, and none has promised to boycott all
such caucuses in the future.
It cannot be said that party caucuses are simply unavoidable. The
eventual agreement that emerged last week came from a caucus that in-
cluded all and excluded none, giving us a genuine model of what work-
able im-partisanship can look like. Party caucuses are a staple of legis-
lative sausagemaking, but an impeachment trial is not legislative
business as usual. Impeachment is in important ways a judicial act, gov-
erned by a special ethos. Indeed, the impeachment oath was designed to
remind Senators (and the rest of us) of the special rules and roles re-
quired.
Oaths are serious business. President Clinton is where he is to-
day-in the dock-because of claims that he did not take his various
oaths (of marriage, of office, in the Jones case, and before the grand
jury) seriously enough. Senators who sit in judgment over him-
especially those who may be tempted to condemn him-should take a
close look at their own oaths and deeds.
H. Evidentiary Issues
In two of the three district judge impeachments during the 1980s,
Senate trials occurred after the judges had been tried and convicted of
statutory crimes in ordinary courts. The Constitution does not require
this sequence, but the Framers expected that it would often make sense.
District judges would be scattered across the continent, as would the
evidence of and witnesses to their wrongdoing. Congress, by contrast,
would sit in the capital, weeks away from the most remote hinterlands.
Given this geography, the Founders anticipated that the easiest venue to
gather all the evidence and witnesses would often be in a trial held in
the judge's home district. After such a trial, the Senate's job in im-
peachment would be much easier-Senators could simply take as given
the facts duly found beyond reasonable doubt in an ordinary court fol-
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lowing strict evidentiary rules and affording procedural rights and other
safeguards to the defendant.
But this system generally will not work in presidential impeach-
ments because it is doubtful under Article II that a sitting President may
be forced to stand trial in an ordinary criminal court. Note the huge
complications all this will raise concerning issues of evidentiary proce-
dure and proof. In an actual trial of Bill Clinton, the Senate will not be
able to simply point to an earlier judicial proceeding that clearly estab-
lished the relevant facts beyond reasonable doubt. The Senate will be
obliged to find the facts for itself. But how? What precisely will the
rules of evidence be? Will the federal hearsay rule-and its countless
exceptions-be enforced? Even if Senators try to dodge the unseemly
business of fact finding in this particular case by using Kenneth Starr's
grand jury transcripts and the like as "evidence," what will happen if the
President's lawyers insist-as fairness surely entitles them to do-on
cross-examining every relevant witness? Given that the Senate is not
accustomed to trying cases-and neither is William Rehnquist, for that
matter-the evidentiary problems that could arise are truly mammoth,
unlike any the Senate has seen in the modem era. Indeed, one of the
tools that the Senate used in the 1980s impeachment cases to cut the
evidentiary monster down to size--delegating fact-gathering to a
committee-is politically unimaginable, and perhaps unconstitutional,
in presidential impeachments. (Could such a committee meet without
the presence of the Chief Justice as a presiding officer? On the other
hand, could the Chief Justice ever preside over such a rump?)






In this Appendix Professor Amar debates many of the key issues
surrounding the impeachment of President Clinton in an email conver-
sation with Stuart Taylor Jr., a senior writer with the National Journal
magazine and a contributing editor at Newsweek This email exchange
first appeared in February, 1999 on the American Lawyer Media On-
line website, and is being reprinted with the express permission of the
American Lawyer, Mr. Taylor and Professor Amar. In the interests of
authenticity, the editors of the Hofstra Law Review have chosen to re-
print this conversation verbatim, and have refrained from conforming
any of the exchange to the dictates of the Bluebook. The email conver-
sation begins with a piece written by Mr. Taylor that was posted to the
American Lawyer Media On-line website on February 3, 1999.
I. PUBLIUS UNBOUND-THE CONSTITUTION ALLOWS THE SENATE TO
CONVICT THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT REMOVING HIM 0
by Stuart Taylor Jr.
I have good news for the Senate. And for the House. And even for
those who (unlike me) want President Clinton censured rather than re-
moved from office.
The news is that a reinterpretation of the Constitution, based on a
close textual inspection, shows clearly that even if two-thirds of the
senators vote to convict Clinton of perjury or obstruction of justice, they
will still have the option of letting him finish his term and (if they wish)
censuring him. While Rep. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) has publicly so
hinted, this view flies in the face of the conventional wisdom, which is
that Senate conviction of an impeached president automatically removes
him from office.
But the conventional wisdom is dead wrong. And so is the related
notion-almost universally espoused in academia, in journalistic writ-
ings (including my own, until now), and in the legal briefs of both the
10. This section was first posted in The American Lawyer Media On-line on February 3,
1999. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Publius Unbound-The Constitution Allows the Senate to Convict the




president and the House managers-that a president can be impeached,
convicted, and removed only for "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Have I gone nuts? A fair question. But I'll bet that you will be
driven toward the same conclusion if you study the relevant text of the
Constitution (quoted below), and especially if you go on to read a path-
breaking but largely unnoticed scholarly paper by a law professor
named Joseph Isenbergh at the University of Chicago. His reinterpreta-
tion unlinks conviction from removal, and unlinks impeachment from
"high" crimes as well.
First, however, clear from your mind the fog of academic and jour-
nalistic commentaries, the out-of-context fragments of the Framers' de-
bates that pervade such commentaries, and the litter of confusing prece-
dents that accompany them. Instead, focus like a laser on the bare,
unadorned words of the Constitution's most relevant impeachment
clauses, reading them anew in the sequence in which they appear.
Article I, which enumerates both the powers of the legislative
branch and the limitations on those powers, has this to say about im-
peachment:
"The House... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment ....
"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of
two thirds of the Members present.
"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Of-
fice of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."
Note, please, that Article I neither defines the grounds for im-
peachment nor imposes any limitation whatever on the category of of-
fenses for which a president may be impeached. Nor does it require the
Senate to remove an impeached official upon conviction.
By this silence, Article I suggests that the House could impeach a
president and the Senate could convict him-and then hold a separate
vote on whether to remove him-for any crime, no matter how low or
high, or perhaps even for having too many drinks or for vetoing a
popular bill. This is consistent with English and colonial law, under
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which impeachment was used to punish both "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors" and a wide range of lesser crimes.
Article I does depart from English law, quite explicitly, by limiting
the penalties ("judgment") that the Senate can impose. These cannot
extend "further than to" removal and disqualification. This language
also suggests that the Senate has discretion to impose a judgment less
severe than removal-such as censure, recognized in English impeach-
ment law.
Now let's turn to the far-better-known impeachment provision of
Article II, Section 4: "The President, Vice President and all Civil Offi-
cers of the United States, shall be removed from office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors."
This provision has long been read as meaning something it clearly
does not say: that the listed offenses are the only ones for which the
House may impeach and the Senate may convict. From this mistaken
premise has followed a mistaken conclusion: that conviction of an im-
peached official must lead to removal.
But Article II, Section 4 does not impose any limitation at all on
the grounds for impeachment. It is essentially a mandatory-sentencing
provision, which requires removal if, and only if, the grounds for the
impeachment and conviction are "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Another problem with the conventional wisdom is the logical con-
tradiction between the notion that presidents are impeachable only for
high crimes and misdemeanors, and the undisputed axiom that they are
also impeachable for crimes such as murder and rape. Such "private"
crimes were clearly not considered high crimes and misdemeanors un-
der English and colonial law as of 1787 because they were not directed
specifically against the state. Nor can the impeachability of murder and
rape be logically reconciled with President Clinton's claims that he can
be impeached only for grave abuses of his executive powers.
These logical contradictions disappear once it is understood that-
both in the English tradition that the Framers adapted and in the words
of the Constitution that they so carefully drafted-murder and rape need
not be high crimes and misdemeanors to be impeachable.
The above analysis is derived in large part from the scholarship of
Professor Isenbergh, who specializes in international taxation while
dabbling (brilliantly) in constitutional excavation. He first propounded
his theory in 1975 in a student note in the Yale Law Journal, where he
was an editor. Last fall, he prepared an updated and expanded version,
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titled "Impeachment and Presidential Immunity From Judicial Process."
It can be found on his law school's Web site (www.law.uchicago.edu).
My brief summary can hardly do justice to Isenbergh's powerfully
reasoned exposition of the language and history of the impeachment
clauses.
In any event, the Isenbergh reinterpretation obviously does not re-
solve the Clinton case. But it does provide a road map for amending the
Senate's rules to escape the straitjacket of equating conviction of an im-
peached president with removal. This would enable senators in either
party who end up convinced that the president committed crimes to vote
their consciences both on the question of guilt and on the question of
removal.
The conventional view that conviction necessitates removal puts
unhealthy pressure on both anti-removal and pro-removal senators,
tempting the former to acquit Clinton regardless of the evidence and the
latter to classify Clinton's crimes as "high" even if that seems a stretch.
The Isenbergh reinterpretation, by contrast, means that senators
who believe that removing Clinton would be bad for the country could
nonetheless convict him, and could then vote against removal on the
grounds that his crimes were not "high" and that the remedy should be
censure.
It also means that senators who believe that the country would be
better off without Clinton would be free to vote for that result on either
of two rationales: Those who doubt that Clinton's conduct should be
classified as high crimes-perhaps out of reluctance to lower the bar for
automatic removal of future presidents-could convict Clinton of low
crimes, and then vote for removal as a discretionary remedy. Those who
consider him guilty of high crimes could simply vote for conviction and
then vote for removal.
The bad news, it may be argued, is that the Constitution as I read it
means that a president could theoretically be impeached and removed
(though not automatically) even for offenses far pettier than Clinton's.
Might not Congress abuse such an unlimited power?
I see little risk of that. The real safeguard against unwarranted im-
peachments has always been the requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote
to convict. It has never been the conventional misreading of the phrase
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors"--which ultimately means whatever
Congress says it means-as a limitation on the impeachment power.
If Isenbergh is right, then how could so many others have been so
wrong over the past 200 years, both in reading the plain language of the
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Constitution and in construing the comments of James Madison and
others at the Convention?
That's a long story. Isenbergh's article offers a cogent explanation.
Every senator who takes the Constitution seriously should read it. This
may be an idea whose time has come.
II. A CONvICT-i-CHIEF?-THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF THE
CONVICTION-WrTHOUT-REMOVAL THESIS IS THAT WE'RE ALL
IMPEACHABLE"
by Akhil Reed Amar
Can the Senate decide to convict Bill Clinton by a two-thirds vote,
yet allow him to remain president? No, says our constitutional tradition
and a vast chorus of distinguished constitutional scholars, right, left and
center. Yes, says tax law professor Joseph Isenbergh and legal commen-
tator Stuart Taylor in recent media pronouncements. Who's right?
The relevant constitutional texts are as follows. Under Article I,
Section 2, the House "shall have the sole Power of Impeachment." Un-
der Article I, Section 3, the Senate "shall have the sole power to try all
Impeachments [and] no person shall be convicted without the Concur-
rence of two-thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Im-
peachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States." Finally, Article II, Section 4 provides that
"The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Convic-
tion of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Under the mainstream reading of the Constitution, all these im-
peachment clauses must be read together, and when they are, the rules
are clear and sensible. Only civil officers-presidents, VPs, cabinet
heads, judges and so on-may be impeached. And they may be im-
peached only for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemean-
ors. Once convicted by the Senate for these crimes (by a two-thirds
vote), they must be removed from office. The Senate, however, has dis-
cretion whether to impose the additional sentence of disqualification
from future office-holding.
11. This section was first posted in The American Lawyer Media On-line on February 4,
1999. See Anar, supra note 8.
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Not so, say Isenbergh and Taylor. On their revisionist view, these
clauses should not be read together, but in divide-and-conquer fashion.
Thus, Article I, Section 2 confers a free-standing impeachment power
not limited by the high-crimes language of Article II, Section 4. In other
words, the House may impeach a president for low crimes or no
crime-for jaywalking or vetoing a porked-up bill. And the Senate un-
der Article I, Section 3 would be free to convict, remove, and even dis-
qualify, a president for these low or nonexistent crimes. According to
Isenbergh and Taylor, the Article II high-crimes clause is simply a
mandatory sentence rule that if a president (or other civil officer) is
convicted of a high crime, he must be removed. But Congress, under its
free-standing Article I power, can impeach and convict for a non-high
crime, in which case the impeachment defendant may but need not be
removed.
Textually, each reading squares-literally. On the mainstream
view, Article II sets the standard def'ming what a person may be im-
peached for under Article I-high crimes and only high crimes. We
must read Articles I and II together (call this the one-two punch) just as
John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison deduced judicial review by read-
ing Article Ill's grant of judicial power to interlock with the Article VI
supremacy clause (call this the three-six punch). In the impeachment
context, the purpose of the one-two punch is to protect officers against a
parliamentary-style regime in which Congress could oust a duly elected
president or a federal judge for any reason or no reason. Under Ameri-
can-style separation of powers, a key concern of the Founding Fathers
was to limit legislative encroachment on the executive and judicial
branches.
On the revisionist view, however, the words of Article II merely
specify a mandatory sentence. But why would a mandatory sentence
rule have been sensible in 1787, given that Congress could always
evade this mandate simply by calling a high crime a low one, and giving
a lower sentence than removal whenever it wanted to? Isenbergh and
Taylor have yet to point to a single Founder who claimed that this was
indeed the purpose of Article II, Section 4, and their thesis is radically at
odds with abundant historical evidence that the Framers were trying to
protect the president (not to mention judges) from being removed for
mere policy or partisan disagreement.
But forget about the president and judges for a moment. Under the




If, as they claim, Article I confers a free-standing impeachment
power unlimited by Article II, then Congress could decide to impeach
anyone, and disqualify that person from ever holding office in the fu-
ture. The only thing in the Constitution that limits this power is Article
11-which speaks only of officers. And under the mainstream view, Ar-
ticle II does indeed limit Article I, by saying who may be impeached
(only officers) and for what (only high crimes). But this is precisely the
one-two punch that revisionists reject.
So if revisionists are right, you, dear reader, could be impeached-
for lying about your sex life, or for supporting a president who lies
about his, or for jaywalking, for that matter. Once convicted by the
Senate, you could be forever barred from holding federal office. And
not even presidential mercy could save you, because Article 11, Section
2 denies the president pardon power in cases of impeachment. On this
view, Congress would have been free in, say, 1850 to permanently ban
all abolitionists (then a small minority, but growing fast) from future
office-holding. In the New Deal, when Democrats held huge congres-
sional majorities, they could have rendered all registered Republicans
permanently ineligible to hold office. Thus we see how revisionism
threatens not only American-style separation of powers, but also basic
civil liberties. This is a dangerous thesis.
And not just dangerous-but also historically implausible. Revi-
sionists point to no one at the Founding who admitted that private citi-
zens were impeachable. Had this been the original understanding, the
opponents of the Constitution would have had a rhetorical field day. But
it was not the original understanding. The Aug. 6 draft Constitution at
the Philadelphia Convention made clear that impeachment would be
limited to officers-but it made this clear in language outside Article
I-in an early version of the one-two punch. In the Federalist Number
65, Alexander Hamilton took pains to stress that "jurisdiction" in im-
peachment was limited to "public men"-pointedly excluding private
citizens. In the very first impeachment case that reached the Senate, in
the 1790s, that body decided that Sen. William Blount could not be im-
peached because, technically, he was not an executive or judicial
"officer" within the meaning of Article II, Section 4. In other words, the
Senate read Articles I and II together-the one-two punch.
Thus, revisionism turns out to be structurally unsound, dangerous
to liberty, historically lame, and in deep tension with important prece-
dents and traditional understandings. It is also-when promoted as a
legitimate option in February 1999-wholly unfair. This odd theory was
not the basis for the House impeachment in December, and so it should
1999]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
not be the basis for Senate action now. Elementary notions of notice and
fair play preclude a kind of bait-and-switch, whereby the basic rules of
the impeachment game are suddenly changed at the end of the trial be-
cause one side seems to be winning.
III. GUIDED MIssIvEs: TAYLOR RESPONDS TO AMAR-READING THE
CONSTnTUTION'S IMPEACHMENT CLAUSES TOGETHER IS RIGHT-IT'S
YOUR CONCLUSION THAT'S WRONG 2
by Stuart Taylor Jr.
Dear Akhil,
Let me begin with two concessions and one clarification.
I concede your point that the reinterpretation of the Constitution
proposed by Professor Isenbergh (and me) should not-and surely will
not-be adopted as part of the Senate's process in the almost completed
trial of President Clinton. Not one senator has warmed to the idea, and it
is now too late to try to sell it in this context.
I also concede that my column was a bit overly strong-in what I'd
call the pardonable sin of columnist's license-in pronouncing the con-
ventional interpretation "dead wrong."
The clarification is that even if everything you've written is true,
there should be no doubt that the Constitution permits the pending
(albeit politically wounded) proposal by Senate Republicans to adopt
"findings of fact" before voting on whether to convict the president.
That said, nothing in your argument shakes my strong sense that
the conventional wisdom is, well, wrong (although very much alive) and
that the Isenbergh thesis is strongly supported by a careful reading of
the text and structure of the Constitution; is more consistent with the
history of the framing than the conventional (or "mainstream," if you
prefer) wisdom; and is barely dented by the overwrought policy con-
cerns and feverishly imaginative, horrible hypotheticals on which you
so heavily rely-perhaps with a view to scaring all us jaywalkers (and
any still-extant 180-year-old abolitionists who hanker for public office)
away from Isenbergh.
12. This section was first posted in The American Lmvyer Media On-line on February 5,
1999. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Guided Missives: Taylor Responds to Amar-Reading the Constitu-




I also am toying with an as-yet-unresearched theory as to why the
conventional wisdom has become so firmly entrenched. (Hint: How
would senators like the idea of being impeachable by the House?)
A sort of point-by-point response follows.
As to the text, you dutifully quote it and rush on without noting
how powerfully it-read as a whole, and in light of the Constitution's
structure-favors the Isenbergh thesis over the conventional wisdom.
First, the fact that the vast majority of limitations on the legislative
power are specified in Article I suggests that this is the most logical
place to look for limitations on the impeachment power. And, in fact,
Article I does impose limitations: the sole power of the House to im-
peach, and of the Senate to "try"; the requirement of a two-thirds Senate
vote to convict; the limitation of penalties to removal from office and
disqualification (a conspicuous departure from English law) from future
office-holding.
But Article I imposes no limitations on the grounds for impeach-
ment. (Isenbergh suggests the Framers implicitly adopted English law
limiting impeachments to crimes; I'm not so sure, in part because of
statements like James Madison's, at the Convention of 1787, that im-
peachment was "indispensable" to deal with "the incapacity, negligence
or perfidy of the chief Magistrate.")
Does Article II spell out further limitations on the impeachment
power, as the conventional wisdom holds? I don't think so. Article II is,
of course, about the executive branch. This structural fact, together with
the text of Article II, Section 4, suggests to me that the conventional
wisdom is wrong in reading in that section an exhaustive listing both of
grounds for impeachment and of persons subject to impeachment.
Section 4 does not say "may be removed." It does not say "shall
only be removed." It says "shall be removed" on conviction of "high
crimes and misdemeanors."
By its terms, it's a mandatory sentencing provision for a subset
("high crimes and misdemeanors") of a broader, undefined category of
impeachable offenses. Similarly, "civil officers" is most naturally (and
structurally) read as a limitation of this mandatory sentencing provision
to executive branch officials. I therefore doubt the correctness of the
conventional wisdom that the words "civil officers" were stuck into Ar-
ticle II, Section 4 to denote a grab-bag category of all impeachable per-
sons-a grab-bag that somehow has been read for 200 years or so to in-
clude Article III judges, but not Article I senators!
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You assert that "all these impeachment clauses must be read to-
gether." Granted. But, as illustrated above, reading them together se-
verely undercuts your argument.
IV. GUIDED MISSIVES: AMAR RESPONDS TO TAYLOR-WHO'S
CALLING WHOM 'OVERWROUGHT' ?' 3
by Akhil Reed Amar
Dear Stuart,
Like you, I begin with a concession. I concede you are a hugely
talented journalist, with a way with words. So when you say that my
refutation of your thesis is "overwrought" and "feverishly imaginative,"
many readers might think that mine was the outlandish view, when in
fact it represents the consensus of virtually all serious constitutional
scholars who have written on the issue.
Many of us have studied the Constitution and its history for
years-week in, week out. Can you (a great journalist) or Joseph (a dis-
tinguished tax lawyer) claim the same? If not, please pause before
making sweeping assertions that all experts are "wrong" because your
view is "more consistent with the history of the framing." Those who
study history as our daily job know that this assertion is highly dubi-
ous-Joseph's pamphlet simply misses or mishandles much of the con-
trary historical evidence.
You find me "overwrought" and "feverish." Let's review things
coolly, point by point.
1. I claim the text makes little sense as a mandatory-sentencing
rule because it can so obviously be evaded at will by calling a high
crime a low one. Your response?
2. I ask whether any Founder ever explicitly said that the text was
simply a mandatory-sentencing rule. Your answer?
3. You claim that limits on impeachment power more naturally
belong in Article I than II. On this logic, judicial review is unconstitu-
tional because the idea is not spelled out explicitly in Article HI. Rather,
judicial review derives from the interplay of Articles HI and VI-a
three-six punch just like the one-two punch in impeachment. There are
countless other examples I could produce if you insist on pushing this
13. This section was first posted in The American Lawyer Media On-line on February 8,




weak point. The more constitutional law you know, the weaker this
point is.
4. You note that the Constitution doesn't explicitly say that only
officers may be impeached and only for high crimes. It also doesn't say
that federal courts have power only over the cases specified in Article
lI. Often, sensible readers infer an only under the basic legal maxim of
expressio unius.
5. I claim your thesis is wildly at odds with one of the Federalists'
main structural goals-to shield the executive and judiciary from Eng-
lish-style parliamentarianism. The more history you know, the stronger
this point is.
6. I claim your logic renders all private persons impeachable-and
for jaywalking. You find this "feverish" and "overwrought," but these
are precisely words that describe Anti-Federalists. Had anyone at the
Founding thought that private persons were impeachable, these feverish
folk would have made a ruckus. The fact that they did not is dramatic
historical evidence against you-as is The Federalist No. 65, and the
Blount verdict.
Now let me propose a graceful exit strategy. If you want to keep
fighting for your outlandish thesis, throwing good money after bad, fine.
But if you prefer, let's talk about another point where we disagree,
where your views are much more plausible. You think that impeach-
ment standards should be identical for judges and presidents-I don't.
Thoughtful scholars are not of one mind on this point-this is a fair
fight. So feel free to change the subject.
Best,
Akhil
V. GUIDED MISSIVES: TAYLOR RESPONDS TO AMAR-I MAY BE A
JOURNALIST, BUT I CAN READ
14
by Stuart Taylor Jr.
Dear Akhil,
Thanks for the reminder that mere journalists and tax professors
are unqualified to dispute the views of full-time professors of constitu-
tional law on their own turf. Would it follow that you should defer to
14. This section was first posted in The American Lawyer Media On-line on February 9,
1999. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Guided Missives: Taylor Responds to Amar-I May be a Journalist,
But I Can Read <http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/opencourttbacklogtc02O999b.htnl>.
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my view-based on almost-full-time study over the past year of the de-
tailed evidence-that the president has clearly committed both perjury
and obstruction of justice?
To be clear, I did not and would not call your basic position either
"overwrought" or "feverish." Those were my words for (respectively)
your policy concerns and your "they-could-impeach-any-of-us-for-
jaywalking" hypothetical.
I will now take your six most recent points in rough numerical or-
der. Since I think our exchanges to date establish that the Constitution's
structure and text (which even a journalist can read all the way through)
favor my side of the argument, not yours, I stress here the policy and
historical arguments. And since I expect that you do know the history
better than I do, I look forward to being educated on what makes you so
confident that it supports your side.
Nos. 1 and 5. Sure, the Senate could evade Article II, Section 4's
mandatory removal for "high crimes and misdemeanors" by calling a
"high crime" a low one. Guess what? They are doing that right now, un-
der the conventional interpretation. In this regard, the Isenbergh thesis is
utterly indistinguishable from the conventional wisdom. So your first
point adds nothing at all to your argument.
This leads me to your point No. 5: the overwrought policy concern
that to deem less than "high" crimes to be grounds for (discretionary)
impeachment and removal would make those steps too easy, moving us
toward the horrible black hole of parliamentarianism.
Inherently manipulable and often manipulated formulas of words
like "high crimes and misdemeanors"--and like "regulate commerce,"
and "the freedom of speech," and "due process," and "equal protec-
tion"--are not our Constitution's most sturdy safeguards against bad
outcomes. Structural safeguards-such as enforcement of the Bill of
Rights by life-tenured judges-have far more bite than parchment barri-
ers.
So it is that our essential safeguard against unwarranted impeach-
ments is the requirement of a 2/3 Senate vote to remove-not the dubi-
ous conventional wisdom that we can only impeach for "high crimes."
Those words have meant a dazzling array of things over the centuries to
senators, scholars and others, whose interpretations have had an un-
canny pattern of lining up with their immediate partisan goals.
President Andrew Johnson escaped removal by one vote in 1868
for conduct that few today characterize as "high crimes." Judges have
been impeached and removed for the "high crimes" of drunkenness (in
1803), lying on tax returns (in 1986), and grand jury perjury to cover up
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noncriminal, nonofficial misconduct (in 1989). And although the 1974
impeachment interruptus of President Nixon is in many ways distin-
guishable from the current matter, the main thrust of the scholarly writ-
ings I have seen from around then through 1997-including the 1974
Impeachment handbook by the great Yale law professor Charles L.
Black Jr., which was recently reissued with a foreword by you, and the
impeachment books by John Labovitz, Michael Gerhardt and the late
Raoul Berger (not to mention Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s not-so-scholarly
The Imperial Presidency in 1973)-strongly support the view that
Clinton's perjuries and obstructions of justice are "high crimes," as Sen.
(and former Senate Democratic Leader) Robert Byrd has said. Then in
1998, for some reason, many full-time constitutional scholars and his-
torians-in some cases contradicting their own prior writings-came
suddenly to the previously invisible but amazingly confident consensus
that pejury and obstruction are not "high crimes." Not when committed
by this president, at least.
No. 2. I have seen no explicit statement by any Founder specifying
either that Article II, Section 4 was-or that it was not-simply a man-
datory-sentencing rule. Have you?
Absent clearly contrary history, text trumps. But in any event, the
history of the Founding as I see it strongly supports my reading of the
text, by suggesting that many of the Founders understood that presidents
could be impeached not only for "high crimes and misdemeanors," but
also for mere misdemeanors. To cite just one of many possible illustra-
tions:
Guess what James Madison said on Sept. 8, 1787, just after the fa-
mous exchange that began (according to Madison's notes) with an ob-
jection by Madison to the inclusion in what was to become Article II,
Section 4, after "treason and bribery," of the words "or maladministra-
tion"? It's well known that Madison complained that "so vague a term
will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate." It's also
well known that "other high crimes and misdemeanors" was then substi-
tuted and adopted on the motion of George Mason. What's less known
is what happened next: "Mr. Madison, objected to a trial of the presi-
dent by the Senate, especially as he was to be impeached... for any act
which might be called a misdemeanor." (Emphasis added).
How can that-and similar statements by Madison, James Iredell,
and others later, during the ratification debates and the First Congress-
be reconciled with the conventional wisdom? The conventional view not
only reads "other high" as modifying "misdemeanors" along with
"crimes," which seems manifestly correct; it also reads "high crimes
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and misdemeanors" as the only grounds for impeachment, which (I ar-
gue here) seems incorrect, but also (contrary to Madison) reads "other
high" as modifying "misdemeanors" along with "crimes." And after
Clinton got caught perjuring and obstructing, the conventional wisdom
stretched still further, to read the clause as barring impeachment even
for proven felonies, unless they also amount to uniquely dangerous di-
rect assaults on the entire system of government, or something like that.
Madison's statement about "any ... misdemeanor" being impeach-
able simply cannot be reconciled with the conventional wisdom-
which, let's remember, itself relies heavily on the same Madison's notes
recounting what was said (by Madison) at the same convention, and on
the same day. But Madison's "misdemeanor" statement computes very
well if one reads Madison's notes of the discussions of Sept. 8, together
with other discussions earlier in the convention (and in the ensuing few
months and years), as reflecting an understanding by Madison and oth-
ers that Article II, Section 4 had by Sept. 8 become a mandatory-
sentencing provision, not an exhaustive listing of impeachable offenses.
Why, you may ask, was this not spelled out more clearly by the
Founders? Actually, it was spelled out pretty clearly, in the text of the
Constitution. And for all we know, it may have been spelled out even
more clearly during the convention: We don't have anything approach-
ing a complete record of what was said there because we have little to
go on but Madison's handwritten notes. They do not purport to be a
verbatim transcript or even a complete account of all discussions. They
do, of course, seem a pretty good guide to what was said by James
Madison.
No. 3. I said that Article I is the most logical place in which to look
for limitations on the impeachment power. I did not say that this alone
settles the whole argument, as you seem to assume in resorting to wildly
inapposite numerological mysteries understood only by full-time consti-
tutionalists.
No. 4. It makes no sense to strain against the most natural reading
of the impeachment clauses by seizing on the omission of the word
"only" in a completely unrelated and semantically dissimilar context in
which "only" would have been redundant: Article mH's careful enu-
meration of judicial powers unmistakably implies that those are the only
powers granted.
No. 6. I do not think the Founders worried about the possibility of
Congress impeaching private citizens-any more than they worried that
Congress might give jaywalkers the death penalty-because their task
was a bit too urgent to allow for spending the 10 years or so it might
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have taken to conjure up every imaginable act of congressional irra-
tionality and then seek to fashion watertight parchment barriers to pre-
vent them all.
Remember, Article I provides that "judgment" in impeachment
cases "shall not extend further than to removal from office, and dis-
qualification ... ." (Emphasis added.) This may implicitly limit im-
peachment to officials, because the use of "and" in this context arguably
suggests that nobody can be disqualified without first being removed.
Even if you read that "and" as meaning "or," you also have to
strain very hard indeed to imagine Congress going through all the time
and agony of an impeachment and Senate trial in order to disqualify a
private citizen from future federal office.
I could, with considerably less strain, come up with horrible hypo-
theticals flowing from the conventional interpretation. How about Con-
gress deciding that a consensual sexual affair is a "high crime"? Or,
perhaps, that such an affair warrants a vote of censure by the Senate?
(That one is no hypo.)
The broader point is that far-fetched parades of horribles are the
last refuge of advocates on the ropes-which helps explain why I am
declining your generous invitation for me to throw in the towel.
You err, by the way, in saying that I think impeachment standards
identical for judges and presidents.
I do doubt that the conventional interpretation of Article II, Section
4 (which I accepted until three weeks ago) can be squared with a dra-
matically narrower definition of "high crimes" for presidents than for
judges.
The Isenbergh thesis, on the other hand, reads the impeachment
clauses logically and sensibly as giving both House and Senate broad
discretion to (among other things) deal differently with presidents than





VI. GUIDED MISSIVES: AMAR RESPONDS TO TAYLOR-YOUR
REVISIONISM PROVED YOUR OPEN-MINDEDNESS; SO WILL REVERSING
YOURSELF'5
by Akhil Reed Amar
Dear Stuart,
Let's review, my friend, the six points.
1. I claim your reading of Article II as a pure mandatory-
sentencing rule and nothing more is illogical because, on your reading,
good-faith members of Congress would always be free to observe a high
crime, but charge a lesser crime and thereby retain total sentencing dis-
cretion to remove or not. You say my (mainstream) reading suffers from
the same problem. Wrong. The mainstream reading attributes a different
main purpose to Article II-to limit WHO may be impeached (only of-
ficers), and FOR WHAT (only high crimes). This is not an illogical
purpose and the clause accomplishes it well. (Also, it is the purpose that
Founders repeatedly attributed to Article II, whereas they never attrib-
uted your proposed purpose-see paragraph 2). As to WHO, the main-
stream view holds that (by expressio unius) Article II protects private
citizens from impeachment; and here Article II has worked perfectly,
confirming many Founding statements that impeachment was limited to
"officers." As to WHAT, the mainstream view holds that (by expressio
unius) Article 1I says that officers may be impeached only for high
crimes. The Founders repeatedly said just this (see paragraph 2), and
contrary to your suggestion that these words mean nothing (for other-
wise your point collapses), the phrase meant something to them. It
meant, at a minimum, that a good-faith Congress could not remove a
President for vetoing an unpopular bill or for being a member of a mi-
nority party, or remove a judge merely because legislators disagreed
with his good-faith rulings. By contrast, on your reading, impeachment
is a free-standing power that good-faith Congressmen may use when-
ever they see fit, even in the absence of any officer criminality or
wrongdoing of any kind. This is a truly radical parliamentarianization of
American government wholly inconsistent with the Federalists' clear
structural blueprint. (See paragraph 5.)
15. This section was first posted in The American Lawyer Media On-line on February 10,




2. What explicit historical evidence do you offer for this (illogical
and radically counterstructural) mandatory-sentence reading? None-
not a single explicit statement clearly proclaiming that Article I im-
peachment may occur outside the confines of Article I's specification.
By contrast, the Founders did explicitly support the mainstream reading.
Begin with Hamilton's Federalist No. 69. His whole point here-and of
Federalists everywhere-is to reassure skeptics that the President will
not become a dictator. He has every incentive to highlight limits on the
Presidency. Yet he never says here or elsewhere (nor does any other
Founder say) "don't worry guys, the President may be removed at will
any time half the House plus two-thirds of the Senate think he is too big
for his britches." Instead, Hamilton says that, unlike the English King,
the president "would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon convic-
tion of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors removed
from office." In context he is clearly saying that these are the only
grounds-any other reading is wishful and willful, conjuring up an in-
visible stealth procedure that no one ever mentioned but somehow eve-
ryone understood. Hamilton's New York counterpart is the Anti-
Federalist Brutus, who writes emphatically that "The only causes for
which [judges] can be displaced, is conviction of treason, bribery, and
high crimes and misdemeanors .... They cannot be removed from of-
fice ... for any error in judgement or want of capacity." Quoting Article
II, Brutus insists that judges "are removable only for crimes .... Errors
in judgement ... can never be supposed to be included in these words,
high crimes and misdemeanors." Whereas Brutus thinks this strong ju-
dicial independence is a reason to vote against the Constitution, Hamil-
ton directly responds in the Federalist No. 78-not by disputing Bru-
tus's reading of the Constitution, but by claiming that strong judicial
independence is a reason for citizens to support the document. Now
hear the words of Pennsylvanian James Wilson, a leading Framer and
later Supreme Court Justice: "In the United States and in Pennsylvania,
impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes,
and to political punishments. The president, vice president, and all civil
officers of the United States; the governour and all other civil officers
under [Pennsylvania,] are liable to impeachment; the officers of the
United States, for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde-
meanors; the officers of [Pennsylvania,] for any misdemeanor in of-
fice." Surely, Stuart, unless we are playing some weird version of Si-
mon Says, this explicitly repudiates your thesis and clearly affirms that
Article II "confines" Article I by limiting WHO may be impeached and
FOR WHAT. Another leading Framer, General Pinckney, expressed
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similar views in the South Carolina ratification debates; and in North
Carolina, the prominent Federalist Archibald Maclaine was emphatic:
"Impeachments are only for high crimes and misdemeanors .... [It is]
the most horrid ignorance to suppose that any officer ... is to be im-
peached for every petty offence ... [Instead, impeachment] will be a
kind of state trial for high crimes and misdemeanors .... [T]he power
of impeachment only extends to officers of the United States." Fellow
Federalist (and later Supreme Court Justice) James Iredell agreed:
"[Impeachment] is calculated to bring [great offenders] to punishment
for crime which is not easy to describe, but which every one must be
convinced is a high crime and misdemeanor." Iredell went on to discuss
in detail why this check, limited to "high officers of state" should never
be used for mere policy disagreement. You have invoked Iredell, but
obviously misread him. You have also misread Madison-but I lack
space here to detail how you are wrenching snippets out of context and
missing the overwhelming pattern of historical and structural evidence.
There is lots more historical evidence against you, and almost nothing
that, properly construed, supports you.
3. You think Article II is an odd place to limit Congress's Article I
impeachment power, but on the mainstream view, Article II does-
among other things-protect Presidents from being removed for any-
thing less than high crimes. Article 11 seems an apt place for this pro-
tection (which also encompasses judges, but presidential impeachment
was paramount in the Founders' minds). Despite your somewhat dis-
missive rhetorical flourish about "inapposite numerological mysteries
understood by full-time constitutionalists," arguments about the inter-
play between different clauses (like Articles I and II) are a basic feature
of constitutional law, as I detail in a February Harvard Law Review ar-
ticle (written long before our Dialogue) entitled "Intratextualism." Later
on---once our current dispute simmers down-I would truly be grateful
for your reactions to this article.
4. You admit it sometimes does make contextual sense to infer the
word "only" where it is merely implied rather than express. You claim
Article II is not such a place-but the historical and structural evidence
(see paragraphs 2 and 5) proves otherwise. The mainstream reading is a
natural one-though not the only semantically permissible one-in the
real world. You, my friend, are yourself proof of this, for you admit that
until recently you, like everyone else, read the clause this way. Unless
the entire world is cockeyed, you must concede that the words can be
read both ways. Then the question becomes which reading makes more
constitutional sense-for reasons of logic (paragraph 1), history (2), and
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structure (5), not to mention two centuries of tradition. And on all these
points, your reading fails quite badly.
5. Indeed, your reading is simply bizarre, structurally-threatening
the basic independence of the executive and judiciary by allowing good-
faith Congressmen to impeach for mere policy disagreement. Your view
means that it is easier for Congress to remove a President for vetoing a
bill than it is to override the veto itself! (The former, on your view, re-
quires only a House majority, whereas the latter requires a House su-
permajority-and on your view, both impeachments and veto-overrides
may be based on political disagreement.) This simply cannot be right-
and if it is, why did no one at the Founding ever remark on this? (See
paragraph 2.) Were Federalists really so stupid as to create the veto
while utterly undermining it?
6. And were they so stupid as to render all private citizens im-
peachable? They explicitly said otherwise, repeatedly limiting im-
peachment to officers (see paragraph 2.) And the only place where this
limit exists is Article II (by expressio unius). You claim this limit might
be implicit(!) in Article I, Section 3-but your and-versus-or gambit
simply fails as a matter of basic mathematical logic. Section 3 says
punishment shall not exceed removal plus disqualification, and mere
disqualification does not exceed this. (B is less than A plus B.) Note
also that Founding statements limiting impeachments to officers in-
voked Article II, not Article I, see paragraph 2.
Stuart, although it is often awkward to back away from ideas one
has publicly embraced, I hope you are open to rethinking your position.
You proved yourself admirably open-minded in giving Joseph's thesis a
close look. Are you willing to be equally open-minded in admitting that
perhaps the thesis has more (and deeper) cracks than you first noticed,




VII. GUIDED MISSIVES: TAYLOR & AMAR SAY FAREWELL
16
by Stuart Taylor Jr. and Akhil Reed Amar
Dear Akhil,
Notwithstanding my urge to respond at length, I sense that my lo-
quacity may be trying the patience of our hosts, and of any readers who
may still be out there. It is time for me to conclude my part of this. So
I'll be brief. For me.
I would be glad to concede error-it wouldn't be my first time-if
our exchanges had persuaded me that Isenbergh and I are mistaken. But
far from doing that, your emails have left me, on balance, more per-
suaded of Isenbergh's thesis than before. This is not because you are not
a persuasive fellow, not because you are not a great constitutional
scholar, and not because your points have not been thoughtful and well-
considered. You are obviously a stunningly good advocate for your
position. And that's why I am left thinking that if the Isenbergh thesis
can survive an attack from someone of your talents-especially on the
history-of-the-framing front-then it has passed the test of strict scru-
tiny. Perhaps, with more time and space than our medium permits, you
would convince me that I am in error. But it hasn't happened yet.
A few specific responses to your latest revisiting of the six num-
bered points.
1. I incorporate by reference my previous post's five paragraphs
under the heading "Nos. 1 and 5," which I think largely suffice to refute
your first numbered point. I stress especially that (a) the real protection
against a slide into parliamentarianism or unwarranted impeachments of
judges is the requirement of a two-thirds vote to remove, and (b) that
even as we speak, the Senate is "observ[ing] a high crime" (to borrow
your words) and yet pretending that the crime is either not "high" or is
unproven. So much for the determinative force of the phrase "high
crimes or misdemeanors"--a porous parchment barrier that is far more
central to your reading of the impeachment clauses than to mine.
2. I incorporate by reference my previous post's six paragraphs un-
der the heading "No. 2." And I repeat that the text of the Constitution is
16. This section was frst posted in The American Lawyer Media On-Line on February 16,




explicit evidence that supports my reading, and that there is very power-
ful implicit support for its various statements by various Founders along
the lines of James Madison's assertion at the Convention that "the
president [can] be impeached ... for any act which might be called a
misdemeanor." I challenge you to support your suspiciously conclusory
and dismissive claim that I have "misread Madison" and have been
"wrenching snippets out of context," and to cite anything I have said
that is misleadingly out of context. Every quotation of less than a full
text can unfairly be called "out of context," and I have supplied far more
context for the snippets that I have cited than you have for yours.
That said, I concede that the language you quote from Hamilton's
Federalist No. 69, James Wilson, Archibald Maclaine, and James Ire-
dell, read in isolation, lends some support to your Argument. But their
comments are very far from being dispositive. Hamilton does not ex-
plicitly say, or even clearly imply, that the President can be impeached
only for "high crimes." And Iredell's comments at the North Carolina
ratification debate are mixed: Consider, for example, his comments that
"the President would be liable to impeachment ... where he had re-
ceived a bribe or had acted from some corrupt motive or other .... The
President must certainly be punishable for giving false information to
the Senate [by] an impeachment for a misdemeanor upon that account."
Nothing there about "high."
I disagree with your suggestion that Hamilton-a strong-
presidency man whose preference for "energy in the executive" perme-
ates his writings, and who was about as close to being a royalist as any
of the Founders-"had every incentive to highlight limits on the presi-
dency." And I suggest that Madison's comments on the impeachment
power, both at the Convention and during the first Congress, and similar
comments by others, are entitled to at least as much and perhaps more
weight than the post-Convention, in-the-heat-of-advocacy comments at
ratification debates that you cite, such as that one sentence from Hamil-
ton's post-convention advocacy in Federalist 69.
It is entirely possible-indeed, it seems likely-that some of the
Founders read the Constitution's impeachment clauses as you do, and
others read them as Isenbergh and I do. If so, the most reliable guide to
the correct reading is the text, and the second most reliable guide may
be the interpretations of those who were most intimately involved in the
drafting of the particular language in question. Here, that would be
James Madison.
And the collected quotations of James Madison on impeachabil-
ity-from his statement early in the Convention that impeachment was
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"indispensable" to protect against the "incapacity, negligence or perfidy
of the chief magistrate" through his statements in the First Congress-
really do provide extremely compelling evidence for the Isenbergh the-
sis, as Isenbergh's paper notes.
During the Virginia ratification debates, Madison said that "if the
president be connected, in any suspicious manner with any person, and
there be grounds to believe that he will shelter them, the House of Rep-
resentatives can impeach him; they can remove him if found guilty."
(Emphasis added.) Translation: The President is impeachable for suspi-
cious activities that are not "high crimes"; removal in such cases is op-
tional.
In the First Congress, in 1789, Madison said that the President
could be impeached "if he suffers [his subordinates] to perpetrate with
impunity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States, or
neglects to superintend their conduct, so as to check their excesses."
(Emphasis added.) He also said that the President "is impeachable for
any crime or misdemeanor before the Senate, at all times." (Nothing
there about "high.") And he said that the House could impeach and the
Senate could convict "an unworthy man" at any time, and that "the
wanton removal of meritorious [executive branch] officers" was an act
of "maladministration"--the very term that had been deleted from Ar-
ticle II, Section 4, at the suggestion of the same Madison, and replaced
with "high crimes and misdemeanors"--that "would subject the Presi-
dent to impeachment and removal." Akhil, if you can explain all these
quotations away, your forensic skills are even greater than I had imag-
ined.
3. I grant you that it is conceivable that the Founders thought that
Article II was a logical place to specify limits on the impeachment
power, given that presidential impeachment was paramount in their
minds. It's also possible, although rather odd, to suppose that the Foun-
ders decided to stick judges into Article II, Section 4 as "civil officers."
But if that was where they decided to list limitations on the impeach-
ment power, why did they end up putting most of the limitations-
including the limitation on "judgment in cases of impeachment" to re-
moval and disqualification-in Article I, along with most other limita-
tions on congressional powers?
A more logical reading, in my view, is that Article II, Section 4 is a
mandatory sentencing provision intended to impose the ultimate limit
on presidential power, by requiring the Senate-when it acts on "oath
or affirmation" to render impartial judgment as a court of impeach-
ment-to remove a president who is guilty of "high crimes" even if (for
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example) he is a popular demagogue and more than one-third of the
senators either want him to stay or might fear to remove him. Even
senators who take their oaths seriously enough to convict a guilty presi-
dent might well be swayed by faction or fear to let him off easy if the
choice between removal and lesser sanctions such as censure is discre-
tionary. The Founders hoped that the Senate would act more as a judi-
cial than as a political body in impeachment trials (see Hamilton's Fed-
eralist 65) and may well have seen mandatory removal on conviction of
"high crimes" as a bulwark against infection of the ultimate decision-
what's the remedy, now that we've convicted the rascal?-by partisan-
ship, faction, or fear.
Of course, the Senate's coddling of our current high-crime-
committing President shows that the Framers' plan to mandate removal
in such a case-under both of my interpretation and yours-has been
thwarted.
Sad, to me, but of limited relevance to our disagreement.
4. Your only new point here is that until recently I accepted the
same conventional view of the impeachment clauses that I now chal-
lenge. So I did. All that shows is that like most people, I don't have
much time to embark spontaneously, without prompting, on the large
project of revisiting the many unnatural readings of the Constitution that
have been become settled law. If I were to embark on such a project,
where would I start? With the peculiar invocation of the due process
clause as the fountainhead of abortion jurisprudence? With the misread-
ing of the 1 lth Amendment as barring lawsuits by citizens against their
own states? Life is too short.
That's why my initial reaction when I first skimmed Isenbergh's
attack on 200 years of conventional wisdom was to toss it aside as sur-
prisingly persuasive but way too late in our history to be taken seri-
ously. Later, I studied it, and the Constitution, and some other stuff, and
talked to some lawyers who had been thinking similar thoughts, and
decided that Isenbergh really was extremely persuasive, if perhaps still
too late.
5. See my answer numbered (1) above.
6. See the answer numbered (6) in my previous posting, which
shows that the possibility of Congress impeaching private citizens was
and is so remote and far-fetched that the Founders would not have wor-
ried about it, nor should we. In response to your closing paragraphs I'll
admit that the settled interpretation of the impeachment clauses may be
right after all. But on balance, I still believe rather strongly that-in
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I'll keep this final response short-I remain very comfortable with
my earlier missives to you, and would refer any doubtful reader to our
last go-round in particular. My first and fifth points there seem to me
quite forceful-dispositive, really-as a matter of logic and structure.
And my sixth point highlights another obvious logical problem with
your thesis. To put all these points together in a sentence: on your view,
anyone may be impeached for anything.
In other words, if Article I, Section 2 is truly a free-standing font of
power unlimited by Article II, Section 4, then everyone is potentially
impeachable--even private citizens-and for conduct that could under
no stretch of the imagination be deemed criminal or immoral. People
could be impeached not merely for "misdemeanor" (misbehavior of
some sort) but for simple demeanor-for being a member of the demo-
cratic party.
And here is where history comes in, for no one at the Founding
said anything close to that. (Many at the Founding did say over and
over things that support the mainstream reading-see point 2 in my last
missive to you. And there is lots more, but I will resist the urge to pile
on.) What Founders did often do is refer to the rather ponderous Article
II, Section 4 phrase "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde-
meanors" with crisper shorthand phrases-as you and I and everyone
may do in conversation and even in print. And some Founders stressed
"high" or "crimes" while others stressed "misdemeanors"--but they all
were arguing within Article II, rather than suggesting that impeachment
standards could exist outside Article II. Thus, none of your Founding
material is a clear statement (1) that private citizens can be impeached,
or (2) that impeachment can occur for no misconduct at all, or (3) that
impeachment can occur outside Article II, Section 4, or (4) that Article
II, Section 4 is merely a mandatory-sentencing rule and nothing more.
At the Philadelphia Convention, for example, it is clear in context that
the conversation is not (as you would have it) between what misconduct
requires removal versus what conduct or misconduct merely permits
removal. Rather, it is about what the basic standards for all removals
should be (in keeping with the mainstream reading).
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Since you are obviously keen not merely on Joseph Isenbergh's
thesis but also on his article itself, let me confess that I am not a fan of
this article. Almost none of the (often rather obvious) counterarguments
and counterevidence I have raised in my missives to you were addressed
in his article. Good articles--even "brilliant" ones-must squarely pres-
ent the counterarguments and counterevidence for their readers to see.
My final point is a personal one: Thanks for keeping our disagree-
ment so agreeable. I obviously read our Constitution very differently
than do you and Joseph, but I send you both my warmest personal
wishes.
Best,
Akhil

